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ABSTRACT
Of the African states experiencing sustained growth and poverty reduc-
tion in recent decades, Rwanda and Ethiopia stand out due to the scope
of their development visions and relatively eﬀective state-driven trans-
formation, leading them to be compared to the East Asian ‘develop-
mental states’. This article argues that these two states are better
conceived as ‘neo-developmental’ due to important diﬀerences in the
international and national constraints they face compared with the East
Asian ‘tigers’. One eﬀect of these diﬀerences is the diﬃculty of attract-
ing investment into manufacturing industry, and the consequent con-
centration of capital in high-end urban real estate. This underscores the
need for eﬀective land value capture and property taxation, which fea-
tured strongly in the East Asian cases. Currently, however, both
Rwanda and Ethiopia lack eﬀective mechanisms for capturing the value
of urban property in a way that is sustainable, redistributive and devel-
opmental. The article explores the politics of eﬀorts to introduce prop-
erty tax in both cases. It argues that property taxation has been
obstructed by conﬂicting imperatives on land reform and tax reform,
alongside resistance from vested interests created by the rapid gener-
ation of real estate-based wealth in the absence of other suﬃciently
lucrative investment options.
FOLLOWING A LONG PHASE OF ‘AFRO-PESSIMISM’ rooted in the sluggish
and sometimes negative growth of the 1980s and 1990s, optimism about
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the development potential of a number of ‘African lion’ states began to
intensify in the late 2000s.1 This optimism is partly predicated on the per-
formance of resource-rich economies beneﬁtting from rising primary com-
modity prices, such as Nigeria and Angola. Yet it also alludes to the
persistent progress of a few smaller, less well-endowed economies that
seem to have deﬁed the economic odds. Foremost among these are
Ethiopia and Rwanda, whose growth and poverty-reduction performance
has been more consistent and concerted than most of the continent.
There has been mounting interest not only in the economic achievements
of these states but the fact that their progress has been substantially state-
driven, deriving partly from unorthodox economic policies, accompanied
by restrictive political environments that have drawn substantial criti-
cism.2 The distinctiveness of these two states is such that a leading
Africanist recently claimed that Ethiopia and Rwanda are ‘the only two
states that can claim to be developmental states in Africa’.3
This reference to ‘developmental states’, now commonplace in discus-
sions of Rwanda and Ethiopia, clearly alludes to the East Asian experience
of successful state-driven development.4 Yet despite important similar-
ities, neither the probability of long-term developmental success in these
African countries nor their similarity to the East Asian ‘tigers’ should be
taken for granted. Although their political leaders have looked deter-
minedly towards the East when devising economic strategies, the inter-
national environment in which they ﬁnd themselves has transformed
beyond recognition since the time of the East Asian miracle. They are also
both highly dependent on foreign aid, and must balance their inclination
towards state-directed development with policy imperatives from
Washington and Europe, as well as the need to attract international cap-
ital in a highly competitive globalized environment. Moreover, they are
landlocked, agrarian economies suﬀering from high transport costs,
1. McKinsey, Lions on the move: The progress and potential of African economies (McKinsey
Global Institute, 2010). Note that this report should be taken with a pinch of salt, especially
as it classiﬁes Ethiopia as a ‘coastal’ country.
2. Filip Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world:
Governance in post-genocide Rwanda’, African Aﬀairs 110, 438 (2011), pp. 1–34; Lovise
Aalen and Kjetil Tronvoll, ‘The end of democracy? Curtailing political and civil rights in
Ethiopia’, Review of African Political Economy 36, 120 (2009), pp. 193–207.
3. Comment made by Christopher Clapham at the workshop ‘Developmental States
Beyond East Asia’, Newcastle University, June 2015.
4. In line with this focus, my use of the term ‘development’ here refers speciﬁcally to eco-
nomic development, comprising economic growth, structural transformation (particularly
away from agriculture), and poverty reduction. The mutually reinforcing achievement of
these goals was a distinctive feature of the East Asian cases. This is not to deny the import-
ance of other conceptions of development, including those linked to the expansion of sub-
stantive social and political freedoms, which took signiﬁcantly longer to emerge in these
countries. Constraints on freedom are notable features of the two countries under consider-
ation, though there is not space to explore these in depth here.
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limited bureaucratic capacity and highly constrained access to far-ﬂung
markets.
For these and other reasons, pursuing the internally integrated industrial
growth that characterized economic transformation in Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong is very diﬃcult. In their attempts to
‘construct comparative advantage’,5 political elites committed to develop-
mental transformation in Ethiopia and Rwanda have focused largely on
upgrading agricultural productivity, agri-processing, and service sectors.
This is starting to change, especially in Ethiopia,6 but despite some success
in securing manufacturing foreign direct investment, many investors per-
ceive larger and quicker proﬁts in large-scale land acquisition for agricul-
ture, or the development of urban real estate. Indeed, the scale of proﬁts
that can be made in the latter, in a context of rapid urbanization, economic
growth, and the inﬂux of international capital and personnel into major cit-
ies, is so substantial as to outweigh a multitude of government incentives to
invest in other sectors. It is consequently little surprise that both construc-
tion and real estate services are booming in both countries.
This presents an opportunity for governments to raise much-needed
revenues. The potential for property taxation to beneﬁt Africa’s develop-
ment has been highlighted in recent years,7 and the importance of captur-
ing land value was also central to the development trajectory of the East
Asian ‘tigers’, as I will show below. If anything, in contexts where invest-
ment in urban real estate is especially appealing due to the limitations of
other options, eﬀective urban land value capture is even more important.
Yet moves towards eﬀective property taxation have largely failed in both
Ethiopia and Rwanda. For diﬀerent reasons in each case, the political
obstacles to property taxation have proven extremely stubborn, partly due
to the ways in which property tax interacts (either consciously or contin-
gently) with land reforms. Conﬂicting imperatives and incentives relating
to land and tax reform have set back the cause of sustainable and progres-
sive urban land value capture in both states.
This article highlights two neglected and interlinked aspects of the
debate on developmental states in Africa: the role of urban property devel-
opment in the politics underpinning developmental coalitions, and the
5. Robert Wade, Governing the market: Economic theory and the role of government in East
Asian industrialization (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1990).
6. Arkebe Oqubay, Made in Africa: Industrial policy in Ethiopia (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2015); Cornelia Staritz and Lindsay Whitﬁeld, ‘Made in Ethiopia: The emergence
and evolution of the Ethiopian apparel export sector’ (CAE Working Paper 2017: 3,
Roskilde University, 2017).
7. Roy Bahl Richard Bird, ‘Subnational taxes in developing countries: The way forward’,
Public Budgeting and Finance 28, 4 (2008), pp. 1–25; Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Kari
Heggstad. ‘Local government revenue mobilisation in Anglophone Africa’ (Working Paper
EP1, Institute for Development Studies, Brighton, 2012); Nara Monkam and Mick Moore,
How property tax would beneﬁt Africa (Africa Research Institute, London, 2015).
3TAXING PROPERTY IN A NEO-DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
prospects for land value capture to contribute to revenue-raising and redis-
tribution. The article begins by situating Rwanda and Ethiopia vis-à-vis the
developmental states concept, exploring key similarities and diﬀerences
with the ‘classical’ developmental state model, before considering the role
of urban land, property, and taxation in this paradigm. It then explores the
political economy of eﬀorts to tax property and implement land reform in
Kigali and Addis Ababa, presenting an analysis of progress, pitfalls, and
obstacles in each case. Despite both exhibiting failures to tax property
eﬀectively, other forms of land value capture have been relatively successful
in raising revenues in recent years, especially in Ethiopia. These forms of
land value capture do not, however, hold the same potential for sustainable
and progressive development as property taxation, and may be undermin-
ing the prospects for the latter to emerge as a signiﬁcant revenue instru-
ment. The article concludes by highlighting key aspects of the challenge
and its implications for ‘neo-developmental states’ in Africa.
Neo-developmental states in Africa
Amid disillusionment with the ‘Washington Consensus’ and the rising
inﬂuence of heterodox interpretations of East Asian success, signiﬁcant
attention has been devoted to the prospects for developmental states in
Africa.8 What distinguishes Rwanda and Ethiopia from the other African
countries discussed in this literature are certain speciﬁc ways in which they
are comparable to (and emulate) the East Asian cases, for example with
regard to the lack of a substantial natural resource base, high and sustained
economic growth rates, and constraints on political freedoms. A growing
body of literature alludes to the parallels between these two countries and
the East Asian experience.9 As in East Asia, there are important diﬀerences
between these two African countries, not least regarding the retention of
land ownership by the state and greater emphasis on manufacturing in
Ethiopia, a stronger market orientation in Rwanda, and the signiﬁcantly
8. See for example Thandika Mkandawire, ‘Thinking about developmental states in
Africa’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 25, 3 (2001), pp. 289–314; Omano Edigheji (ed.),
Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa: Potentials and challenges (Human
Sciences Research Council, Cape Town, 2010); Ben Fine, ‘Can South Africa be a develop-
mental state?’, in Edigheji (ed.), Constructing a democratic developmental state in South Africa,
pp. 169–182; Timothy M. Shaw, ‘Africa’s quest for developmental states: ‘Renaissance’ for
whom?’, Third World Quarterly 33, 5 (2012), pp. 837–851.
9. David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Developmental patrimonialism? The case of
Rwanda’, African Aﬀairs 111, 444 (2012), pp.379–403; René Lefort, ‘Free market economy,
‘developmental state’ and party-state hegemony in Ethiopia: The case of the ‘model farmers’’,
The Journal of Modern African Studies 50, 4 (2012), pp. 681–706; Alex DeWaal, ‘The theory and
practice of Meles Zenawi’, African Aﬀairs, 112, 446 (2013), pp. 148–155; Tim Kelsall, Business,
politics, and the state in Africa: Challenging the orthodoxies on growth and transformation (Zed Books,
London, 2013); Iginio Gagliardone, ‘New media and the developmental state in Ethiopia’,
African Aﬀairs 113, 451 (2014), pp. 279–299; Oqubay,Made in Africa.
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diﬀerent size of their populations and economies. This makes them par-
ticularly interesting countries to compare with one another, an endeavor
that surprisingly few researchers have yet systematically undertaken.
Despite these diﬀerences, their common aﬃnity with the East Asian
developmental state model is worth highlighting in greater detail.
First, the governing regimes in Ethiopia and Rwanda, in power since
1991 and 1994 respectively, are characterized by a dominant ‘develop-
mental orientation’ among the political elite,10 linked to the fact that
the needs of their political survival are in line with the needs of eco-
nomic development.11 Both regimes exhibit the strategic state entrepre-
neurialism analyzed by Alice Amsden in South Korea, and close-knit
relations between state and private sector reminiscent of the ‘authoritar-
ian corporatism’ that Robert Wade observed in Taiwan.12 Eﬀorts to
discipline capital, control ﬁnance, and guide foreign investment are evi-
dent in both countries, though more markedly in Ethiopia.13 The use
of party- and military-owned ﬁrms in both states to make strategic
investments is now well known.14 In both cases, the state also holds
majority shares in key banking institutions and retains control over cru-
cial assets, notably land in the case of Ethiopia,15 highlighting similar-
ities with the approach in the East Asian city-states of Singapore and
Hong Kong.16 As in the East Asian cases, they lack major natural
resources for generating export revenues, and are characterized by a
persistent sense of regime insecurity due both to the potential for
domestic unrest and the presence of hostile armed forces in the wider
region.17 The presence of a political class committed to developmental
transformation, and explicitly oriented towards East Asia in its pursuit
10. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The growth of industrial policy, 1925–
1975 (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1982).
11. Wade, Governing the market; Adrian Leftwich, States of development: On the primacy of
politics in development (Polity, Cambridge, 2000).
12. Wade, Governing the market; Alice Amsden, Asia’s next giant: South Korea and late indus-
trialization (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989).
13. Sarah Vaughan and Mesﬁn Gebremichael, ‘Rethinking business and politics in
Ethiopia’, Africa Power and Politics Programme Research Report 2 (Overseas Development
Institute, London, 2011); Toni Weis, ‘Dominant parties and the private sector in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A typology of approaches, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 8,
3–4 (2014), pp. 263–281.
14. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Developmental patrimonialism?’; Vaughan and
Gebremichael, ‘Rethinking business and politics in Ethiopia’; Pritish Behuria, ‘Between party
capitalism and market reforms: Understanding sector diﬀerences in Rwanda’, The Journal of
Modern African Studies 53, 3 (2015), pp. 415–450.
15. John Markakis, Ethiopia: The last two frontiers (Boydell and Brewer, Rochester, 2011).
16. Eddie Chi-Man Hui, Vivian Sze-Mun Ho, and David Kim-Hin Ho, ‘Land value cap-
ture mechanisms in Hong Kong and Singapore: A comparative analysis’, Journal of Property
Investment and Finance 22, 1 (2004), pp. 76–100.
17. Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie and Dan Slater, ‘Systemic vulnerability and the
origins of developmental states: Northeast and Southeast Asia in comparative perspective’,
International Organization 59, 2 (2005), pp. 327–361.
5TAXING PROPERTY IN A NEO-DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
of this goal, is also a feature of both states, and something written about
extensively by the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles.18 Importantly,
it is not only the political and economic structures that bear resem-
blance but also the continued progress on economic and social indica-
tors over an extended period of time,19 as well as many aspects of the
constrained political environment.20
Despite these many important similarities, the development trajectories
of Rwanda and Ethiopia are diﬀerent in critical ways from their East
Asian predecessors. First, their capacity to discipline ﬁrms and guide
investment is partially constrained by high dependence on international
aid and policy advice from donors generally averse to sustained state inter-
vention. Second, the regional dynamics characteristic of the East Asian
experience are lacking, whereby a proximate ‘model’ (such as Japan)
could both be emulated and provide a regional market for lower value-
added product inputs as it moves up the value chain. Third, they are land-
locked and face infrastructure and transport costs on a diﬀerent scale
from the coastal, island, and city-state geographies of the East Asian
‘tigers’, despite major infrastructure projects attempting to mitigate this,
especially in Ethiopia. Major land reforms have been undertaken in both
countries (although these diﬀer substantially, as shown below) in an eﬀort
to reduce the power of landed interests and promote development, some-
thing that was crucial for laying the foundations of successful industrial-
ization in East Asia.21 However, the Rwandan and Ethiopian governments
lack the capacity to convert former landlords into an industrial class in the
way that was achieved in South Korea and Taiwan.22
Consequently, while all the East Asian developers were dependent on
exporting manufactured goods, there is a less concerted focus on industri-
alization in Ethiopia and Rwanda—especially in the latter, which has
largely geared itself towards transforming agriculture and developing ser-
vice sectors including ICT, logistics, ﬁnance, and tourism. This is partly
strategic given that under current global conditions, countries are running
out of industrialization opportunities sooner and at much lower-income
18. Meles Zenawi, ‘States and markets: Neoliberal limitations and the case for a develop-
mental state’, in Akbar Noman, Kwesi Botchwey, Howard Stein, and Joseph E. Stiglitz
(eds), Good growth and governance in Africa: Rethinking development strategies (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2012), pp. 140–174.
19. See for example Africa’s Pulse, Volume 7, April 2013, <http://www.worldbank.org/
content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Report/Africas-Pulse-brochure_Vol7.pdf> (13 May
2016).
20. Hilary Matfess, ‘Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental authoritarianism and the new
politics of African strong men’, African Studies Review 58, 2 (2015), pp. 181–204.
21. Cristóbal Kay, ‘Why East Asia overtook Latin America: Agrarian reform, industrialisa-
tion and development’, Third World Quarterly 23, 6 (2002), pp. 1073–1102.
22. Manuel Castells, ‘Four Asian tigers with a dragon’s head’, in Richard P. Appelbaum
and Jeﬀrey William Henderson (eds), States and development in the Asian Paciﬁc Rim (Sage
Publications, Newbury Park, CA, 1992), pp 33–70.
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levels than their forebears,23 notwithstanding some eﬀorts to integrate
into global value chains. While contemporary developing countries may
be able to look to services-led growth strategies instead, services are typic-
ally skill-intensive and do not have the same capacity as manufacturing to
absorb the kind of large-scale low-skilled labor in which many African
countries are so abundant.24
For all these reasons, we can consider Rwanda and Ethiopia ‘neo-develop-
mental states’: states led by regimes with the intensity of developmental orien-
tation possessed by their East Asian forerunners, which is translating into
sustained growth and poverty-reduction, but which are globally and region-
ally anchored by diﬀerent sets of incentives and constraints. While there are
parallels between the concept of ‘neo-developmental states’ and the idea of
‘developmental patrimonialism’, the latter is speciﬁcally concerned with
dynamics of centralized rent-management over particular time horizons. The
concern here is rather with the strategic role of the state in harnessing domes-
tic and international forces towards national economic interests, including
the politics of securing investment into key economic sectors over others.25
The role of property and land value capture in developmental states
Despite their focus on industrialization, strategic urban property develop-
ment and the capture of value from land and property played a central
role in the strategies of several of the East Asian ‘tigers’. Land value cap-
ture is used here in a broad sense to refer to the range of instruments used
by governments to derive revenue from the value of land and structures
build upon it.26 This may include leasing or sale of publicly owned land,
land acquisition and resale, recurrent (e.g. annual) property taxes, capital
gains taxes, and betterment levies based on imputed increases in property
value due to public investment or changes in property rights.
The city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong have been termed ‘prop-
erty states’ due to deliberate state-led property development and the cen-
tral role of land and buildings in national wealth.27 From an early stage,
there was an eﬀort in both Singapore and Hong Kong to drive the
23. Dani Rodrik, ‘Premature deindustrialization’, NBER Working Paper No. 20935
(Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015), p. I; Oqubay, Made in
Africa, p. 10.
24. Rodrik, ‘Premature deindustrialization’, p. 24.
25. Amsden, Asia’s next giant; Ziya Öniş, ‘The logic of the developmental state’,
Comparative Politics 24, 1 (1991), pp. 109–126.
26. This follows Chi-Man Hui et al., ‘Land value capture mechanisms’, p. 77. There are
also more speciﬁc deﬁnitions that deﬁne land value capture as when governments trigger
increases in land values via regulatory decisions or infrastructure investments and then redis-
tribute this land value increment, see Ian Palmer and Stephen Berrisford, ‘Urban infrastruc-
ture in sub-Saharan African cities’ (African Centre for Cities, Cape Town, 2015).
27. Anne Haila, ‘Real estate in global cities: Singapore and Hong Kong as property states’,
Urban Studies 37, 12 (2000), pp. 2241–2256.
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economy through property while also recapturing some of that value for
public investment, limiting speculative investments in the real estate sec-
tor to incentivize investments in manufacturing.28 In both of these cases,
most land is publicly owned, allowing the government not only to subsid-
ize certain land uses like housing and industry by providing free or cheap
land but also to capture the value of land leased for private development
and prevent speculation. Land value was captured through auctioning
land leases but also various forms of progressive property-related taxes,
including annual taxes on real property, rental income tax, betterment lev-
ies, and taxes on capital gains.29 These instruments resulted in substantial
government revenues. Annual property taxes alone account for around 8
percent of the total tax collected nationally by Singapore’s inland rev-
enue,30 almost double the high-income country average of 4.5 percent.31
Alongside its property-led strategy, Singapore used its ﬁscal structure to
help encourage investment into industry from an early stage, drawing on a
relatively educated population and well-developed infrastructure.32
Urban property development features less strongly in growth narratives
of South Korea, a largely rural society with less than 30 percent of the
population living in cities in 1960 when its economic transformation
started in earnest. However, urbanization was extremely rapid: the urban
population rose to almost 50 percent by 1975 and 75 percent by 1990.
There were precipitous rises in land prices in the 1970s and 1980s, such
that between 1974 and 1996, land values in Seoul increased 33-fold.33
Signiﬁcantly, however, progressive property taxes were adopted from the
1970s to prevent excessive speculation and to facilitate redistribution.34 It
was only from the mid-1980s, when returns from surplus capital in the
industrial sector were diminishing, that speculative urban property devel-
opment took oﬀ and property developers became a more politically salient
sector.35 Yet the taxes were already in place, and at the turn of the millen-
nium, property-related taxes comprised a higher percentage of tax revenue
in Korea than in any other country in the OECD.36
28. Haila, ‘Real estate in global cities’, p. 2247.
29. Chi-Man Hui et al., ‘Land value capture mechanisms’.
30. Haila, ‘Real estate in global cities’.
31. John Norregaard, ‘Taxing immovable property: Revenue potential and implementation
challenges’ (International Monetary Fund report, Washington D.C., May 2013), p. 40.
32. Castells, ‘Four Asian tigers with a dragon’s head’,
33. Hae Un Rii and Jae-Seob Ahn, ‘Urbanization and its impact on Seoul, Korea’, in
Forum on Urbanizing World and UN Human Habitat II (Columbia University, New York,
2002), pp. 83–100.
34. Thomas Dalsgaard, ‘The tax system in Korea: More fairness and less complexity
required’, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 271 (OECD Publishing,
Paris, 2000).
35. Hyun Bang Shin, ‘Property-based redevelopment and gentriﬁcation: The case of
Seoul, South Korea’, Geoforum 40, 5 (2009), pp. 906–917.
36. Dalsgaard, ‘The tax system in Korea’.
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Property-related taxes also played a key role in local revenue mobiliza-
tion in Taiwan. In 1985, when the territory was mid-way through its
extraordinary growth, ‘house taxes’ and ‘land value increment tax’ (a
form of capital gains tax) collectively comprised over 70 percent of local
government revenues.37 As shown below, this percentage is far higher
than is common for developing countries today. Moreover, the policy of
capturing land value dates back to as early as 1912, and was made con-
crete in a 1954 statute that explicitly aimed to use property taxation to
ensure ‘public enjoyment of future land increment’.38
This focus on capturing property values does not mean that unusually
high levels of taxation were central to the East Asian success; in fact, the
tax/GDP ratios were not much higher than the average for countries in
Africa.39 Rather, the composition of taxes diﬀered signiﬁcantly, with East
Asian countries having relatively high levels of direct taxation including
property-related taxes.40 Given these aspects of the East Asian story, the
degree to which East Africa’s aspiring neo-developmental states are emu-
lating this focus on capturing land and property values is an important
concern. This concern is underscored by the absence of a clear route
towards industrialization in many African states, meaning that economic
elites are especially inclined to maximize proﬁts from land itself, including
in the form of urban real estate.
The role of the urban in the development trajectories of contemporary
African states varies signiﬁcantly, but rarely resembles the ‘urban bias’
lamented by Robert Bates and others in the 1970s and 1980s, whereby
political elites were seen as pandering to urban industrial classes.41
Rather, we see an ascendant class of urban property owners alongside
‘urban fantasies’ based on ‘speculative urbanism’ and images of iconic
real estate from Dubai to Singapore.42 Moreover, in Rwanda and
Ethiopia speciﬁcally, there is a substantial class of returnee elites, often
bringing signiﬁcant capital with them, for whom urban land oﬀers espe-
cially attractive investment opportunities. The sectors of the economy
linked to urban real estate are consequently booming. In Rwanda, the
compound annual growth rate for construction in the period 2006–2013
37. Alvin H. S. Lam, ‘Republic of China (Taiwan)’, in W. Samuels (ed.) Land value tax-
ation around the world, Special Issue of the American Journal of Economics and Sociology 59, 5
(2000), p. 330.
38. Ibid, p. 328.
39. Alice Sindzingre, ‘Financing the developmental state: Tax and revenue issues’,
Development Policy Review 25, 5 (2007), pp. 615–632.
40. Atul Kohli, State-directed development: Political power and industrialization in the global
periphery (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004).
41. Robert Bates, Markets and states in tropical Africa (University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1981).
42. Vanessa Watson. ‘African urban fantasies: Dreams or nightmares?’, Environment and
Urbanization 26, 1 (2014), pp.1–17.
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was 19.66 percent, dwarﬁng all other sectors of the economy. Real estate
services also grew at 6 percent, while the compound annual growth rate of
manufacturing over the same period was just 3.26 percent.43 Meanwhile,
in Ethiopia, the real estate sector grew by an annual average of 14.1 per-
cent in the second half of the 2000s, which is signiﬁcantly above the over-
all GDP growth rate.44
The high degree of urban concentration and limited transport infra-
structure characteristic of many African states means that the capital
city tends to become ever more magnetic for real estate investment. In
Kigali, government policy embraces the development of luxury housing
and commercial real estate by private developers. The national social
security fund has invested in major high-end housing projects, while the
Kigali Master Plan envisages a gleaming futuristic city, and the
Rwandan development board has allowed generous incentives in the
construction sector. Partly due to the inﬂux of international personnel
and capital after the genocide,45 rental incomes in Kigali reached ‘US
prices’ by the end of the 2000s, with houses commonly being rented to
expatriates for US$3,000 per month or more.46 Given the great poten-
tial for proﬁts, it is not surprising that 73 percent of investment from
the top 10 domestic investors between 2006 and 2010 was in real estate
or construction.47
In Ethiopia, urban real estate is equally if not more lucrative, although
not explicitly favored. It is very hard to get loans for real estate develop-
ment, so for those who already have capital to invest, building houses is
all the more proﬁtable given the high demand relative to supply. Proﬁts of
100 percent are commonplace in Addis Ababa for those with the ﬁnance
to build and sell, and house prices commonly double every 5 years.48
Moreover, the Ethiopian diaspora, who bring substantial resources to
invest in the country, are prohibited from investing in the ﬁve key sectors
of banking, telecommunications, media, insurance, and transport, which
the government considers strategically important to keep within the
domestic sphere.49 Consequently, much of the investment from the dias-
pora community is in real estate, often in the form of commercial
43. Figures acquired from the Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Development,
June 2014.
44. Access Capital, ‘Sector report—Real estate’ (Access Capital, Addis Ababa, 2010).
45. For a discussion, see Tom Goodfellow and Alyson Smith, ‘From urban catastrophe to
‘model’ city? Politics, security and development in post-conﬂict Kigali’, Urban Studies 50, 15
(2013), pp. 3185–202.
46. Interview, taxation adviser, Kigali, 1 December 2009.
47. Tom Goodfellow, ‘Rwanda’s political settlement and the urban transition:
Expropriation, construction and taxation in Kigali, Journal of Eastern African Studies 8, 2
(2014), pp. 311–329.
48. Interview, property developer, Addis Ababa, 30 September 2014.
49. Interview, Ethiopian Investment Authority, Addis Ababa, 1 October 2014.
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buildings for rental.50 Indeed, 60 percent of all investment by diaspora in
the period between 1994 and 2014 was in real estate and related services.
They invested four times more in this sector than in manufacturing, despite
numerous oﬃcial incentives in place for the latter, and 91 percent of all
diaspora investment was in Addis Ababa. Over the same period, domestic
investors also invested more in real estate than in any other sector, includ-
ing manufacturing.51
This dominance of property in both cases as a sphere for domestic and
diaspora investment raises important questions about whether and how the
value that accrues to real estate assets is being captured by the public purse
for broader development goals, as it was to a signiﬁcant degree in the East
Asian ‘tigers’. Rwanda and Ethiopia diﬀer in critical ways from these states,
as has already been noted. Yet there are reasons to believe that these diﬀer-
ences make eﬀective land value capture mechanisms more rather than less
important. Although not city-states like Singapore or Hong Kong, Ethiopia,
and especially Rwanda are relatively densely populated and can ill aﬀord for
land to be used in suboptimal ways. Moreover, having large, mostly poor
rural populations as well as growing and relatively unskilled urban popula-
tions, the need to drive investment into sectors that can absorb labor is
urgent, even if global conditions make ﬁnding such investment challenging.
Ethiopian diaspora investment data indicate that investments in manufactur-
ing create more jobs than investments in real estate by a ratio of four to
one,52 yet the latter is where many investors are channeling their capital.
This developmental imperative to generate jobs and transform the
economy, alongside the need to raise government revenues to fund basic
infrastructure, bolsters the need for eﬀective land value capture mechan-
isms. Given their institutional and infrastructural constraints and very low
average incomes, we would not expect Rwanda or Ethiopia to adopt the
same mix of land value capture instruments as Singapore. There is, how-
ever, little evidence that the reforms thus far adopted to capture land and
property values in either are well suited to their own development require-
ments. Rather, the progressive, anti-speculative, and developmental prop-
erty taxation they need has been actively blocked or more passively
resisted, with worrying long-term consequences.
Kigali: confusion and passive resistance
The government led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took
power in 1994, introduced a decentralization policy from 2000 through
50. Ibid.
51. Figures acquired from the Ethiopian Investment Authority, October 2014.
52. Ibid.
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which substantial resources and responsibilities were devolved to local
governments. The Law No. 17/2002 institutionalized various types of
central-local transfer and decentralized three taxes previously collected
centrally: a recurrent property tax, trading licence tax, and rental income
tax. These were supposed to form the bedrock of local revenue for dis-
tricts, alongside various fees for speciﬁc services and rent paid on plots of
leasehold land (discussed below). All property owners with freehold titles
were obliged to pay property tax, barring various exemptions. Some of the
city’s older properties were already on government registers (though often
valuations were from as long ago as the 1960s), with owners required to
pay 0.2 percent of the registered value annually in tax.53 Owners of new
properties were supposed to have their properties valued for taxation, with
assessments based on square meters of land and buildings.
A new local taxation law at the end of 2011 (Law No. 59/2011) intro-
duced signiﬁcant changes.54 In contrast to the previous approach to prop-
erty taxation, this law aimed to introduce a tax based on market (capital)
value rather than ﬂoor area. The law speciﬁes that market values should
be determined on the basis of self-reported value, but outlines only in
very general terms how market values should be assessed, which in the
words of one local tax expert is ‘asking for trouble’.55 Perhaps even more
problematic is that the new law set the tax rate at 0.1 percent of the
assessed value for all properties, whether commercial, residential, or
industrial. The 0.2 percent levied previously was already remarkably low
by international standards.56
Both before and after these changes, the performance of property tax
as a revenue instrument was extremely weak. In the late 2000s, property
tax comprised at most 4 percent of locally collected revenue.57 In many
developed countries it commonly accounts for over 50 percent of locally
collected revenues and, in some cases, 100 percent.58 Even in neighbor-
ing Uganda, it accounts for over a third.59 Instead, most of Rwanda’s
locally generated revenue is composed of various forms of fees. In 2012,
53. Interview, government decentralization oﬃcial, Kigali, 4 February 2010. For further
details on this and other aspects of property taxation and land leasing in Kigali, see Tom
Goodfellow, ‘Taxing the urban boom: Property taxation and land leasing in Kigali and Addis
Ababa’ (Working Paper Working Paper 38, International Centre for Tax and Development,
Institute for Development Studies, 2015).
54. In this law, property tax is referred to as ‘Fixed Asset Tax’. I will, however, retain the
use of the term ‘property tax’ throughout this paper for consistency and to avoid confusion.
55. Personal communication, 5 November 2014.
56. Interviews, various taxation experts, Kigali, 2009–2015.
57. Musharraf R. Cyan, Canisius Karuranga, and François Vaillancourt, ‘Local govern-
ment revenue potential in Rwanda’ (report by Georgia State University, Andrew Young
School of Policy Studies, 2013).
58. Norregaard, ‘Taxing immovable property’.
59. Tom Goodfellow, State eﬀectiveness and the politics of urban development in East Africa
(PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012).
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property tax brought in less than a third of the amount generated by
market fees or fees for public cleaning services, for example. It was
also stagnant. Despite the problems involved in interpreting property
tax revenue over time, evidence suggests that property tax reported
zero growth in 2011–12 in 2011–12,60 and even declined in 2012–13
after the tax rate was lowered.61 This picture contrasts sharply with
what was unfolding in the real estate sector. The property develop-
ment taking place in Kigali over the past two decades led one expert
to suggest in 2009 that in Rwanda property taxation could, hypothet-
ically speaking, amount to as much as 5 percent of GDP.62 In 2013, the
amount of property tax collected nationally was just 0.018 percent of
GDP.63 This is extraordinarily low even by the standards of developing
countries, a selection of which was found to average at 0.6 percent,64
and African countries, for which the overall average is estimated at 0.5
percent.65
It is puzzling as to why such a development-oriented state, lauded for
its tax reforms more generally,66 has failed to signiﬁcantly improve its sys-
tem for property taxation. Accounting for this requires situating the prop-
erty tax problematic in relation to the land lease system that was
introduced in the context of Rwanda’s land reform in 2004–5. The 2005
Organic Land Law denationalized land and introduced a two-tiered sys-
tem, under which investors in urban land meeting certain speciﬁcations
are entitled to freehold titles. Meanwhile all other landholders are granted
an ‘Emphyteutic lease’ of 20–99 years, depending on land use, in
exchange for paying a lease contract fee (based on plot size and location,
and payable in annual installments) and committing to develop the land
according to relevant land use conditions.67 Leaseholders may convert
their leases into freehold titles if they meet these conditions and pay the
fee in full.68 The crucial point here is that those with leasehold titles pay
60. Cyan et al., ‘Local government revenue potential in Rwanda’, p. 54.
61. Interview, researcher, Kigali, 9 June 2014.
62. Interview, taxation adviser, Kigali, 26 November 2009. This is would be even higher
than is typical for OECD countries, which average at around 2.1 percent of GDP (OECD
library, data available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/taxes-on-property_20758510-
table7, accessed 20 April 2015). Some countries do have signiﬁcantly higher proportions,
however, with the UK ranking the highest at 4.3 percent (ibid).
63. This is based on the amount of property tax collected in 2013 as a proportion of the
2013 GDP according to World Bank ﬁgures (available at: http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD, accessed 20 April 2015).
64. Norregaard, ‘Taxing immovable property’.
65. Fjeldstad and Heggstad, ‘Local government revenue mobilisation’.
66. Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Mick Moore, ‘Revenue authorities and public authority in
sub-Saharan Africa’, The Journal of Modern African Studies 47, 1 (2009), pp. 1–18.
67. The state retains ultimate title on leasehold land.
68. Interview, government decentralization oﬃcial, Kigali, 4 February 2010; Interview,
land oﬃcial, Kigali, 9 December 2011.
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land lease fees, while holders of freehold properties, which constitute only
3 percent of land parcels in the country, pay property tax; the latter
replaces the former once you have a freehold title.
This dual system was intended as a way of spurring planned develop-
ment of every plot, while also ensuring a steady ﬂow of revenue from land
based on simple square-meter calculations, and increasing the number of
landholders paying property tax over time. However, the system rests on
the perception that freehold ownership is something desirable that people
should (and do) aspire to. Enthusiasm among donors and foreign advisors
for Hernando de Soto’s ideas on formal property titling looms large here:
the assumption is that people will want full title for the security it provides
them over their land, and this will spur both development and the broad-
ening of the property tax base.69
The experience so far in Kigali is not bearing this out. Land and hous-
ing oﬃcials in the city aﬃrm that even those eligible to pick up freehold
titles have often not done so, partly because if they did they would have to
pay property tax, which may be signiﬁcantly more than what they are pay-
ing in lease fees.70 This was aﬃrmed by other sources, including real
estate brokers and a lawyer.71 The result was a ﬁscal situation in which
two identical properties could be paying very diﬀerent amounts simply
based on whether the landholder has or has not picked up a freehold title,
with the latter paying a lease fee that eﬀectively exempts structures on the
land from any taxation whatsoever. Calculations suggest that many lease-
holders are paying around a ﬁfth in land lease fees of what a freeholder
would pay in property tax on an identical plot, even with the very low
property tax rate.72 One observer commented that ‘more or less only the
people who are stupid enough to pay [property tax] pay’.73 The supposed
beneﬁts of freehold ownership were not suﬃcient to incentivize most peo-
ple to upgrade to freehold.
The beneﬁts of freehold ownership are also not being articulated in a
way that resonates locally. Part of the problem is that both the concepts of
freehold and leasehold, and the supposedly signiﬁcant distinction between
them, are essentially foreign to the Rwandan context and contribute to
the lack of public understanding about the diﬀerences between various
local taxes and fees.74 One long-term advisor on decentralized revenue
conﬁrmed that ‘there is huge confusion over what is property tax and
69. Hernando De Soto, The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails
everywhere else (Basic Books, New York, 2000).
70. Interview, oﬃcial, Kigali, 4 June 2014.
71. Interview, lawyer, Kigali, 2 June 2014; interview, property broker, Kigali, 5 June 2014.
72. Interview, RRA oﬃcials, Kigali, 4 June 2014.
73. Interview, taxation adviser, Kigali, 8 June 2014.
74. Interview, land and housing oﬃcial, Kigali, 8 June 2014; interview, researcher, Kigali,
9 June 2014.
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what is Location Parcelle [the land lease fee]’.75 There are also widely diver-
ging understandings of property tax among those who are supposed to
administer it. In the words of one observer, ‘not even the districts can tell
the diﬀerence between property tax and [land lease fees] most of the
time’.76 Meanwhile, there is a common belief that leaseholders pay land
lease fees, and freeholders who rent out should only pay rental income tax—
another category of tax altogether based on actual rent received. In fact,
all freeholders are supposed to pay property tax regardless of whether they
rent the property out and also pay rental income tax. As far as many actors
are concerned, property tax simply does not exist, despite apparently
being central to the government’s decentralization policy 15 years ago.
In addition to this confusion, there were missed opportunities with
regard to how the DFID-funded Land Tenure Regularization Programme
(LTRP) was conducted. From 2009, the LTRP process provided a win-
dow of opportunity to register properties for taxation: allocating land titles
could be combined with identiﬁcation of buildings on the land and even
the gathering of data for the purposes of valuation.77 The government,
however, was concerned that people might be discouraged from partici-
pating in the LTRP if they knew it could lead to taxation,78 so this did not
happen. Consequently, the land registry contains no information on what
is built on land; there was no cadastre of real property developed through
the process that would facilitate ‘switching on’ a property tax at a later
stage.79 Rwanda is, therefore, in a situation where the majority of people
pay lease fees based on square meters, which reﬂect nothing of the market
value of land, cannot capture any value increment over time, and are
ﬁnite, being payable in one lump sum or installments over 10 years. The
irony is that once the plots are fully developed and of higher market value,
owners can become freeholders and switch from a lease fee system to a
property tax system that not only has extremely low rates but is eﬀectively
optional because enforcement is weak.
Many of these problems are resolvable, and the Rwanda Revenue
Authority ‘know they’ve dropped the ball on property tax’,80 recently
bringing in the IMF and other experts to report on the situation. A clear
priority is to expand the property tax base beyond freeholders, who are
likely to remain a small minority. The question is whether political con-
straints will prevent this from being implemented, given the rapid accru-
ing of real estate wealth in Rwanda that has thus far largely remained
75. Interview, former taxation oﬃcial, 4 June 2014.
76. Interview, researcher, Kigali, 9 June 2014.
77. Interview, taxation adviser, Kigali, 26 November 2009.
78. Interview, government advisers, Kigali, 23 November 2009; interview, oﬃcials at the
National Land Centre, Kigali, 3 December 2009.
79. Interview, city oﬃcial, Kigali, 5 June 2014.
80. Interview, architect, Kigali, 3 June 2014.
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untaxed, creating a powerful vested interest. The current system is regres-
sive because while many large property owners pay virtually nothing,
much of the revenue from land lease fees is garnered from small plots that
would actually be exempt under an expanded property tax, being of little
market value. The RPF government is very eﬀective in raising revenues
from the lower-income groups in society;81 shifting over to a property tax
for all urban plots would be a radical progressive move that partially
reverses this trend, as it would mean high-value real estate paying far
more tax while many ordinary city-dwellers might ﬁnd themselves legitim-
ately paying nothing. In Rwandan politics, where the elite coalition under-
pinning the RPF is fragile,82 this could be a very risky move.
An aversion to disrupting what has thus far been a relatively untouched
sphere of elite capital accumulation helps to explain the long history of
‘passive resistance’ to meaningful property tax in Rwanda,83 which now
dates back two decades. One advisor claimed he had ﬁrst talked to the
government about developing a functional system in 1997, and despite
ministerial enthusiasm found no progress at all on the issue by 2003, and
hardly any more by 2009.84 Such inertia is uncharacteristic of Rwanda,
which generally implements reforms fast. While the 2011 law could have
been a turning point, it proved a false start for three reasons. First, insti-
tuting a market values-based system in a country with a nascent real estate
profession, lacking in transparent transactions to form a basis for valu-
ation, is highly problematic. In the words of one observer, ‘nobody has
any clue about market values’.85 Second, the 2011 law did nothing to
resolve the dichotomy between diﬀerent kinds of payments on freehold
and leasehold properties, which has severely constrained the tax base.
Third and most glaring was the slashing of the tax rate to 0.1 percent.
According to close observers of developments in taxation, the draft ver-
sion of the 2011 law had set the property tax rate at 0.5 percent, reﬂecting
international norms, and had addressed the freehold/leasehold issue by
making leasehold properties subject to property taxation.86 Politicians in
parliament revised both of these clauses before the law was passed, which
if anything suggests a shift from ‘passive’ to more active resistance.
81. See Goodfellow, ‘State eﬀectiveness’.
82. For a discussion, see Pritish Behuria, ‘Centralising rents and dispersing power while
pursuing development? Exploring the strategic uses of military ﬁrms in Rwanda’, Review of
African Political Economy 43, 150 (2016), pp. 630–647.
83. Interview, taxation adviser, Kigali, 1 December 2009.
84. Interview, taxation adviser, Kigali, 26 November 2009.
85. Interview, construction sector specialist, Kigali, 15 January 2015.
86. Interviews, taxation specialists, Kigali, 6 and 8 June 2014. For further details on this
and other aspects of property taxation and land leasing in Addis Ababa, see Goodfellow,
‘Taxing the urban boom’.
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Indeed, the fact that ‘property owners are often lawmakers’ is self-
evident.87 The interests in urban land, and degree to which this has
caused large-scale expropriation of the urban poor, have been discussed
elsewhere.88 It seems clear that there is an enormous political hurdle to be
overcome in Rwanda if the situation with regard to property taxation is to
substantially improve.
Addis Ababa: ‘people are already feeling taxed’
Since the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
took power in 1991, Ethiopia has instituted a radical system of ‘ethnic fed-
eralism’, whereby the country is divided into nine federal states and two
separately administered cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. This has
important ﬁscal implications, set out in the 1994 Constitution. The gov-
ernments of federal regions and cities possess powers to tax the incomes
of employees within their regional state, as well as the proﬁts of enter-
prises located within them and various other revenue sources usually col-
lected centrally, including VAT. Thus, there are no transfers of revenue
to Addis Ababa, unlike cities in decentralized systems or indeed most
urban areas in Ethiopia, which acquire 70 percent of their resources in
transfers from the regional states in which they are located. Addis Ababa
collects all its own taxes.89
In addition to the taxes outlined above (known as ‘state taxes’), there
are a series of municipal revenues collected locally. State taxes are col-
lected by regional branches of the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs
Authority, while municipal revenues are collected by the lowest rungs of
local government (woredas or kebeles) as well as, in the cities, an intermedi-
ate tier of ‘sub-city’ government oﬃces. Among these is a municipal tax
known variously as ‘roof tax’ and ‘city house tax’—the equivalent of prop-
erty tax.90 This relates to buildings only. There is no single revenue
instrument based on the combined value of land and buildings, but there
was in the past. Property taxation in Ethiopia dates back to 1937 under
the Italian occupation, and was based on annual market value (i.e. the
amount that a property could yield in rent each year) rather than capital
value.91 After the socialist revolution in 1974, when land was nationalized,
87. Interview, Kigali, 3 June 2014.
88. Vincent Manirakiza, and An Ansoms, ‘Modernizing Kigali: The struggle for space in
the Rwandan urban context’ in An Ansoms and Thea Hilhorst (eds), Everyday forms of land
grabbing in the Great Lakes region of Africa (James Currey, Oxford, 2014); Goodfellow,
‘Rwanda’s political settlement and the urban transition’.
89. In 2014, the federal revenue authority was actually collecting taxes on behalf of the city
authority, but this was supposed to be temporary and is beyond the scope of this article.
90. Hereafter where the term ‘property tax’ is used, this refers to the ‘roof tax’/‘city house
tax’.
91. Interview, property taxation expert, Addis Ababa, 26 September 2014.
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a new law split property tax into roof tax and land rent, as land itself was
no longer taxable property but something rented from the state. In theory,
the roof tax was still based on annual rental value, with rates ranging from
1 percent to 4.5 percent of annual value depending on a range of
criteria.92
Soon after the EPRDF displaced the socialist Derg regime in 1991,
they realized that the property valuation rolls being used for taxation were
extremely out of date and only captured a fraction of the city’s fast-
growing housing stock. Consequently, a major census of properties in
Addis Ababa was undertaken in 1996, using a computerized system and a
team of 3,000 enumerators. Through this exercise, all properties (includ-
ing informal structures) were identiﬁed and valued. This resulted in a
new tax bill being presented to all property owners, indicating that they
were currently paying only around a quarter of what they should be in
property tax according to the recalculated values. This prompted such an
outcry that the city government instructed the valuation team to slash the
values to a quarter of what had been painstakingly calculated, rendering
the whole exercise essentially pointless for properties already on the
register.93
Since 1996, there has been no revaluation of properties in the city.
Meanwhile, the population of Addis Ababa almost doubled from 1.8 mil-
lion in 1990 to 3.2 million in 2014.94 Even for houses on the register,
severe undervaluation is the norm. One 2006 study of Lideta sub-city
examined cases where properties listed on government valuation rolls had
also been valued by banks, and found that on average the banks’ valua-
tions were 300 percent higher. For some properties, the banks’ valuations
diﬀered by thousands of percent.95 This disparity is likely to be even high-
er today. When new structures are built, property owners can get some-
one to come and value the property ‘if they want to pay the tax’.96
Evidently (and unsurprisingly) very few do. The general consensus was
that most owners of privately owned houses ‘pay nothing, because the
government does not know them’.97
As a proportion of total city revenue (including all state revenue and
municipal revenue), the contribution of the roof tax is just 0.1 percent.
Even if we look at ‘municipal revenues’ only, which cumulatively
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. UN population division data, available at: <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/wallcharts/
WUP_2014 percent percent20Urban percent percent20Agglomerations percent
percent20Wallchart.pdf> (13 May 2016).
95. Bacry Yusuf, Sileshi Tefera, and Admit Zerihun, Land lease policy in Addis Ababa
(Private Sector Development Hub, Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce, 2009), p. 60.
96. Interview, property taxation expert, Addis Ababa, 26 September 2014.
97. Interview, local researcher, Addis Ababa, 26 September 2014.
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constitute only 5 percent of the city’s budget (the vast majority being from
‘state taxes’), the roof tax comprises just 1.65 percent of this.98 Property
tax is, therefore, a miniscule proportion of city revenue by any standards.
Addis Ababa collects more revenue from ‘engineering and asset estima-
tion service fees’ or ‘fees for medical examinations’ than it does from
property taxation. The situation in the capital is also signiﬁcantly worse
than in some other federal regions, where regional governments have used
their devolved powers to substantially increase roof tax rates. One source
pointed out that ‘I pay four times more property tax in Adama for a small
house than I pay for my big house in Addis Ababa’.99
In short, despite the thorough eﬀorts in the 1990s to register and revalue
properties, property tax in Addis Ababa has been rendered ‘almost non-
existent’ by interventions to deliberately undervalue properties, the lack of
revaluation over time, and the failure to register properties constructed in
the past two decades.100 As well as privately built houses, this includes the
mushrooming high-rise commercial developments throughout the city and
over 100,000 condominium apartments built by the government over the
past decade, which have proved lucrative revenue sources for many owners
but have not been registered, let alone valued, as taxable assets.101 The
value created by the state’s own property entrepreneurship is thus not being
recaptured ﬁscally as it was in East Asia. In the words of one government
oﬃcial, the problem of property taxation in the city ‘is untouched’.102
As in Rwanda, understanding how this relates to the land question is
critical. Although relinquishing national ownership of land was unthink-
able for the EPRDF when they came to power,103 the regime found itself
faced with a land use system that neither yielded much revenue nor pro-
vided the foundations for the rapid development it was determined to pro-
mote. Existing land use was governed by a permit system, in which the
government would issue permits for people or organizations to use par-
ticular plots for indeﬁnite periods in exchange for rent, which bore no
relation to market value.104 There was no formal mechanism for capturing
the value of land. The new regime wanted to combine continued state
land ownership with market-driven development, and soon began investi-
gating the possibilities for a system of land leasing along the lines of what
was happening in other countries transitioning from socialism.105
98. Figures acquired from various government agencies in Addis Ababa, September–
October 2014.
99. Interview, oﬃcial in international agency, Addis Ababa, 24 September 2014.
100. Interview, local researcher, Addis Ababa, 23 September 2014.
101. Interview, housing expert, Addis Ababa, 1 October 2014.
102. Interview, tax oﬃcial, Addis Ababa, 23 September 2014.
103. Markakis, Ethiopia.
104. Interview, land expert, Addis Ababa, 4 October 2014.
105. Ibid.
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Based on a series of study visits including several to China, a system was
developed which provided for government to transfer rights over land for
speciﬁed periods of time while retaining the ultimate title. Minimum
benchmark prices per square meter of land were set, which would apply to
certain kinds of favored development such as schools, manufacturing
industry and the condominiums. Commercial developments would be
expected to pay signiﬁcantly more. Initially, the modality for establishing
prices for commercial developments was exclusively through auction, with
the benchmark as the starting price. Again following the example of China,
however, a modality of ‘negotiation’ was introduced in 2002 alongside auc-
tioning, though the basis for such negotiation was never entirely clear.106
Having to purchase leases resulted in radically increased costs for usage
of urban land, which inevitably generated resistance to the new system. To
ease its passage, the old permit system was maintained alongside the leas-
ing framework; people already holding permits could continue to use their
land in exchange for minimal rent, while the government worked towards
conceiving a way to incorporate all land into the leasehold system.
Meanwhile, the land leasing system resulted in highly erratic pricing. A
study of 1,000 land transactions from 2002 to 2009 found that 96 percent
of plots were leased through ‘negotiation’, with the remaining 4 percent
split between allotment at benchmark prices and auctioning. According to
the same report, land lease prices followed ‘neither logic nor theory, neither
policy priorities nor grades, neither ﬂoor prices nor size of plots’.107 The
price per square meter for one plot of land within a given sub-city of Addis
Ababa might be as much as 50 times higher than another plot in the same
area. By this time, land leasing was already generating more than 20 times
more revenue than property tax or any other fees relating to property.108
In 2011, a new government proclamation took the leasing system a step
further through a controversial measure to incrementally incorporate all
land into the leasing system.109 This meant that whenever a plot held
under the old permit system was sold, instead of the permit transferring as
part of the sale (as had happened previously), the new landholder was
required to take out a lease from the government at the benchmark price,
which is updated every 2 years.110 These measures contributed to an
ongoing increase in local revenue garnered through land leasing. The
106. Yusuf et al., Land lease policy in Addis Ababa.
107. Ibid, pp. 105–106.
108. Figures acquired from various government agencies in Addis Ababa, September–
October 2014.
109. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Land Lease Holding Proclamation (No. 721/
2011).
110. Leases in Addis Ababa are 99 years for residential housing, science and technology,
research and study, government oﬃces, charities; 70 years for industry; 60 years for com-
merce; and 15 years for urban agriculture (Article 18).
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2011 proclamation also abolished the opaque modality of negotiation,
making all commercial land leasing dependent on auction. The average
price of leases sold through auction was always signiﬁcantly higher than
those sold through negotiation, so subjecting all commercial land pur-
chases to compulsory bidding in monthly auctions paved the way for
prices to rapidly escalate. By late 2014, some plots of land were selling for
65,000 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) in parts of the city,111 and on 5 December,
a plot of land in Addis Ketema sub-city was auctioned for ETB 307,000
per square meter—around $15,500. This is higher than the average price
for developed real estate in Geneva ($15,250), the ﬁfth most expensive city
in the world for property.112
These soaring prices are clearly contributing to increased revenue for
the city administration. They do, however, raise questions about the sta-
bility and sustainability of urban revenue over time, quite aside from the
eﬀects that this kind of land-based ﬁnancing might have on displacement
of the urban poor, the path to which is eased by new rules on government
powers to ‘clear’ land in the 2011 Land Proclamation. As sources of gov-
ernment revenue, leases are ﬁxed sums of money rather than continuous
payments like taxes. They are also determined at a speciﬁc point in time
and, therefore, do not change over time with market values of the land. In
terms of revenue stability, sales may vary hugely from one year to the
next, and urban land is ultimately ﬁnite. Moreover, land lease fees will
not recapture any of the value of structures built on the land; for this, a
real property tax is required.
As noted previously, despite clear evidence that the urban property
market and construction sector are booming, the existing property tax
(‘roof tax’) has remained stagnant. As in Rwanda, there are moves to
address this issue and a growing awareness of the potential for property
taxation. A major four-year study and pilot project supported by the
Gates Foundation and the German development corporation, GIZ, is
underway. Signiﬁcantly, however, a strategic decision was made not to
conduct the pilot in Addis Ababa, where it was felt that there was ‘too
much politics, the land leasing system had just come in [and there would
be] too much mayhem’.113 The property tax project being developed is,
therefore, going to be piloted instead in three secondary cities: Dire
Dawa, Bahir Dar, and Mekelle.
While the thought and strategic planning going into this project are evi-
dent, the question is whether the government will actually ‘pull the
111. Various interviews, Addis Ababa, September–October 2014.
112. Capital (Ethiopia) ‘It’s oﬃcial: Addis, one of the most expensive cities in the world’, 8
December 2014, <http://capitalethiopia.com/2014/12/08/its-oﬃcial-addis-one-of-the-most-
expensive-cities-in-the-world/#.WSNialKZN0s> (13 May 2016).
113. Interview, project adviser, Addis Ababa, 30 September 2014.
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trigger’ by rolling the project out after the pilot exercise, which ultimately
means bringing it to Addis Ababa.114 There are major political obstacles
to doing so when, in the words of one source, people are ‘already feeling
taxed, due to the new land lease system’.115 All who acquire new property
ﬁnd themselves now paying lease fees substantially higher than any nom-
inal land rent they had paid previously, which makes the introduction of
an eﬀective property tax highly politically challenging. Moreover, when
the lease fee system was introduced, explicit public announcements were
made as part of the ‘hard sell’ that people would not be taxed on their prop-
erty once they had paid for the lease.
There are reasons to think that the EPRDF may be more willing to fol-
low through on reform than the RPF in Rwanda. Although massive real
estate wealth has accrued in Addis, which is partly why the pilot exercise
is avoiding the capital, the government has demonstrated its willingness to
face down this sector by constraining access to ﬁnance and land for real
estate, in contrast to the situation in Kigali. However, the politics of gov-
erning Addis Ababa is also colored by the history of sustained opposition
to the EPRDF in the Ethiopian capital and the fear of urban uprising,116
exacerbated since the state of emergency declared in 2016–17. While elite
resistance is the most substantial obstacle in Kigali, in Addis there is also
the question of how the wider population will respond to the imposition
of a real property tax when many are used to paying miniscule amounts of
roof tax. Such reforms would impact substantially on the growing urban
middle classes living in housing a tier above the low-income and shack
accommodation that would mostly be exempt. Unlike in Rwanda, court-
ing the urban middle classes has been an important priority for the
EPRDF, which is a driving factor behind major public projects such as
the condominium housing and the Chinese-funded Addis Ababa light
railway. Property tax would also impact very signiﬁcantly on domestic and
diaspora investors currently channeling capital into real estate. The latter
category in particular already have a fractious relationship with govern-
ment, and are too numerous and wealthy to ignore.117
Conclusion
The failure of both Rwanda and Ethiopia to institute eﬀective and pro-
gressive property taxes is linked to some of the crucial diﬀerences between
these ‘neo-developmental’ states and their East Asian forebears. In the
114. Ibid.
115. Interview, taxation adviser, Addis Ababa, 30 September 2014.
116. See Aalen and Tronvoll, ‘The end of democracy?’
117. Terrence Lyons, ‘Conﬂict-generated diasporas and transnational politics in Ethiopia:
Analysis’, Conﬂict, Security and Development 7, 4 (2007), pp. 529–549.
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East Asian cases, there was either no established landlord class to begin
with (as in the city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore), or this class was
crushed and turned into an industrialist class capable of driving forward
structural transformation of the country.118 Ethiopia and Rwanda share
similar preconditions in that pre-existing landholding classes were largely
destroyed through socialist revolution and post-genocide transition,
respectively. Yet notwithstanding some progress in manufacturing in
Ethiopia, the obstacles to transforming into industrial powerhouses are
formidable, due to intense and ongoing competition from established
low-wage manufacturing hubs in Asia as well as donor imperatives to lib-
eralize their economies. This leads many elites towards the relatively
much easier and more lucrative proﬁts available in real estate, bolstered
by the lack of eﬀective taxes on property. Thus, a powerful class con-
cerned to protect property rents now holds disproportionate inﬂuence
relative to their forebears in East Asia at a similar stage of development,
where the ascent of manufacturing provided broader scope for proﬁtable
investment and where robust land value capture mechanisms were already
in place.
The precise nature of the problem diﬀers signiﬁcantly in the two coun-
tries. In Rwanda, the problematic freehold/leasehold divide in terms of
property taxation may be on the way out, judging by a draft law at the
time of writing. However, even if the removal of this distinction radically
expands the tax base, the extremely low tax rate will be politically diﬃcult
to raise, and the administrative challenges remain overwhelming. In
Ethiopia, there is a more solid technical base to build upon, but govern-
ment ownership of land and the public relations challenge of introducing
the tax on top of controversial lease fees remain major obstacles, in Addis
Ababa particularly. In the meantime, the capital is transforming fast.
Instituting real property taxation needs to happen before land for leasing
(and the revenue that accompanies this) starts to run out, leading govern-
ment to expropriate more land in potentially very socially regressive and
politically explosive ways.
In both cases, land leasing is proving a much bigger revenue stream
than property tax. But land leasing alone is not enough for states that
need urgently to build viable urban economies and sustainable local gov-
ernment revenues, as it leaves untouched the structures built on proper-
ties and does not capture increments to value over time. It is also
increasingly associated with the displacement of low-income communities
and selling oﬀ of rights to the highest bidder, rather than generating rev-
enue to provide services in the interests of the majority. Furthermore, it
118. Kay, ‘Why East Asia overtook Latin America’; Castells, ‘Four Asian tigers with a dra-
gon’s head’.
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provides no disincentive to speculative property development that might
also help to spur more productive investment elsewhere. The East Asian
developmental states implemented a range of solid property-related taxes
as well as land leasing. Their African aspiring counterparts would do well
do take this lesson very seriously.
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